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Presumptive taxation, in which an income proxy is used as tax base, has been and is still used 
today in countries with very diverse situations - developing, transition and developed 
countries. Usually, this form of taxation is thought of as a revenue-raising device in presence 
of widespread imperfect tax compliance. We investigate the question of whether presumptive 
taxation can be used as a redistributive instrument. To this end, we employ an occupational 
choice model in which an individual can be either an entrepreneur or a worker. We allow for 
different abilities to dodge taxes across social classes, and consider both the case in which a 
conventional income tax is in place alongside presumptive taxation and the case in which only 
presumptive taxation is operating. We argue that a revenue-neutral reform introducing a 
lump-sum presumptive tax based on occupational choice can improve social welfare, and 
sometimes even lead to a Pareto-improvement. 
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Several governments across the world have relied in the recent past and still rely today on
various forms of presumptive taxation, in which indirect methods are used for evaluating the
e⁄ective tax base and computing the corresponding tax liability.1 Basically, the e⁄ective tax
base is estimated using a set of variables that are strongly correlated with it, and are easily
observable, but at the same time cannot be tampered with by the taxpayers; for example, the
type of occupation, labor costs, telephone and electricity bills, the number of employees, the
size of the store, and so on.
Remarkably, countries with very diverse backgrounds have used these methods: the list
includes France, Israel, Italy and the Netherlands, some large Latin American countries (Ar-
gentina, Chile and Colombia), countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in Central and Eastern
Europe (Albania, Hungary, Macedonia and Poland, among others) ￿see Tanzi and Casanegra
(1989), Taube and Tadesse (1996), Harrison (1997), Cnossen and Bovenberg (2001). Sometimes
(typically in the more developed countries), presumptive taxes are used whenever income is dif-
￿cult to ascertain, e.g. for small individual ￿rms or in the agricultural sector, and act alongside
a proper income tax; sometimes (mostly in developing and transition countries) they fully re-
place the conventional tax structures. Unfortunately, there is no abundance of hard data which
allow us to assess the relative importance of presumptive taxation, but what little evidence we
have or may infer seems to suggest that it does not play a minor role: for example, in Italy up
to 13% of reported income might in fact be presumptive income.2
Normally, presumptive taxes are conceived as a rough but e⁄ective way of raising revenue
whenever the government lacks the capability of properly administering an income tax. Since
imperfect tax compliance is a sizeable phenomenon not only in the developing but also in the
1Strictly speaking, all taxes are presumptive, since ￿(t)he conceptually pure tax base ... cannot be perfectly
measured, and the tax authority is constrained to rely on some correlate of the concept.￿(Slemrod and Yitzhaki,
2002, p. 1457). However, there are cases in which the correlate is immediately found and others in which the
gap to bridge is relatively large.
2This estimate is based on data available from the Italian Treasury site on http://www.￿nanze.it/
comunicare/2002/dichiarazioni_99/tabelle/tab102.htm) and concerns the Personal Income Tax (IRPEF) returns
for the 1999 ￿scal year. According to our computations, about 13.3% of reported income comes from profes-
sionals, single entrepreneurs and unincorporated ￿rms. These kind of taxpayers are dispensed from tax audits
if they report earnings at least as high as a ￿presumptive￿income level (which is computed as a percentage of
input costs). In fact, virtually all of them report, and are taxed on the basis of, this presumptive income, which
is quite lower than their actual earnings in normal years.
1transition and OECD economies, it is no surprise that the usage of presumptive taxes is so
widespread. In a recent world survey of the shadow economy, Schneider and Enste (2002) argue
that during the 90￿ s the average size of the underground sector was 12% of GDP for OECD
countries, 23% for transition countries and 39% for developing countries. Andreoni et al. (1998)
report that, according to the IRS, in the USA 17% the income tax is not paid and about 40%
of families underpay their taxes. An additional concern is that the ability to dodge taxes is
not equally distributed among taxpayers. For example, small business may ￿nd it easier not to
comply with their tax obligations than large corporations; public employees have a much harder
time at trying to cheat the government than employees of minor ￿rms who can receive ￿black￿
payments for, say, extra-time. The conventional strategies of increasing the penalties for tax
evasion and/or the frequency and the quality of tax audits, or by reforming the tax code so
as to reduce the opportunities of exploiting the so called ￿tax loopholes￿do not always work.3
They may be too costly, or simply they may be ine⁄ective: a sale ￿under the counter￿for cash
does not leave any direct evidence in the accounting books. Hence the recourse to presumptive
taxes.
Here, we are interested in the question whether presumptive taxes can be used to collect
revenue in an equitable way and to perform some redistribution.4 An answer in the a¢ rmative
would de￿nitely raise their status from rough revenue-rasing devices to more sophisticated
redistributive instruments, and might remove many objections to their use. To study this issue,
we employ an occupational choice model in which two kinds of taxpayers exist: entrepreneurs
and workers. It is assumed that both types of individuals can dodge conventional income taxes,
although the ability to do so varies with the occupation. In this setup, presumptive taxes may
be based on occupational choice:5 ￿xed lump-sum tax payments, or licence fees, di⁄erentiated
according to the type of occupation, are widely used in Central and Eastern Europe (Azerbaijan,
Albania and Hungary, among others) ￿ see Harrison (1997); in Italy, there is a standard income
tax allowance conditional on occupational choice, which is smaller for self-employed individuals.
3See Slemrod (1994) for an analysis of optimal income taxation with tax enforcement.
4Previous contributions on presumptive taxation, such as Bennet (1987), Sadka and Tanzi (1993) and Slemrod
and Yitzhaki (1994), focus on di⁄erent aspects of the problem than those addressed in this paper.
5Another kind of presumptive taxation which is used in some countries (e.g. France, Israel, Italy, Azerbaijan
and Poland) is that based on physical inputs or on input costs (e.g. the number of employees or the wage bill).
We study this variety of presumptive taxes in a companion paper (Balestrino and Galmarini, 2002), using a
slightly di⁄erent model ￿see also fn. 14 below.
2We assess the desirability of introducing lump-sum presumptive taxes by means of small revenue-
neutral reforms, and ￿nd that in a number of cases they are indeed capable of performing some
redistribution.
The present note is outlined as follows. In section 2 we illustrate the model. Section 3
deals with presumptive lump-sum taxation based on occupational choice. Section 4 o⁄ers some
concluding remarks.
2 An occupational choice model6
Consider a large population of individuals whose size is normalized to unity. Each individual is
identi￿ed by a parameter n representing ability; we take n to be a continuous variable uniformly
distributed7 over the [l;h] interval, 0 ￿ l < h, N = h￿l. Importantly, n is private information.
Each agent can choose among two options: to become an entrepreneur (e) or to become a
worker (w). An individual that chooses e hires s > 0 e¢ ciency units of labor at a wage rate
w, in order to produce sn units of a consumption good. Her gross income is s(n ￿ w), where
sn represents revenue (the output price is normalized to unity) and sw represents labor costs.
An individual that chooses w supplies n e¢ ciency units of labor in the labor market; hence his
income is wn. There is no labor-leisure choice on the part of both entrepreneurs and workers.
Also, shifting between occupations is costless.
Within this simple model, there are two possible tax bases that the government can use for
redistributive purposes: income and occupational choice. As regards income, tax authorities
have no direct knowledge of the skill level n, and hence of the income, of both workers and
entrepreneurs. Thus income taxation must rely on reported income, which may di⁄er from
actual income. As a result, agents will engage in tax avoidance,8 i.e. will not report their actual
income level, so as to gain a more favorable tax treatment. Income taxation is restricted to be
linear. However, as tax authorities are assumed to observe the occupational choice (e or w) of
each individual, they can, in principle, make taxes conditional on occupation. This is a very
6The present framework is based on Balestrino and Galmarini (2002), where we adapt a model originally due
to Boadway et al. (1991) to the case of imperfect tax compliance.
7The assumption is for expositional convenience. The model can readily be extended to other distributions of
the parameter n.
8We represent tax dodging as tax avoidance (a costly but riskless activity) rather that tax evasion (a risky
activity). This keeps the model simple without any major e⁄ect on the results. On the relationship between the
two representations of imperfect tax compliance, see Cowell (1990a, 1990b) and Balestrino and Galmarini (2003).
3simple form of presumptive taxation that assesses the ability to pay not only on the basis of
income, but also on the type of occupation.
Let yi, i 2 fw;eg, be net income (consumption) associated to option i. The following
assumption characterizes agents￿preferences.
Assumption 1 (i) If y0i > y00i, i 2 fw;eg, then y0i ￿ y00i. (ii) If yi > yj, i;j 2 fw;eg, i 6= j,
then yi ￿ yj. (iii) If yw = ye, then yw ￿ ye.
A1(i) simply says that, within each option, a higher income is preferred to a lower one. A1(ii)
says that whenever two options give a di⁄erent income then the one with the higher income
is preferred. A1(iii) strikes a choice whenever the two options give the same income: for
equal income, w is preferred to e (but, nothing of substance changes if we make the opposite
assumption).9
To de￿ne entrepreneurs￿net income, let ae 2 [0;1] be the fraction of avoided income. Tax
avoidance costs are assumed to be linear in gross income: the per-unit-of-gross-income tax-
avoidance-costs, ce(ae); depend on the fraction of concealed income.10 ce(:) satis￿es the follow-
ing restrictions (throughout the paper, subscripts denote derivatives):
Assumption 2 (i) ce(0) = 0, ce > 0 for ae > 0. (ii) ce
a(0) = 0, ce




A2(i): Full reporting is costless, whereas tax avoidance is always costly. A2(ii): The marginal
cost of concealing the ￿rst unit of income is zero; then the marginal cost is positive and increasing
in the level of concealed income; the marginal cost of concealing the last unit of income is greater
than or equal to one.
Provided that n ￿ w ￿ 0,11 the net income of a type-n entrepreneur is thus equal to:
￿ ￿ ￿ + [1 ￿ t + tae ￿ ce(ae)]s(n ￿ w);
9The assumption is innocuous. Since the productivity parameter is distributed on a continuous interval, the
probability that an agent is indi⁄erent between the two occupations is zero.
10Let ￿ = s(n ￿ w). The standard way of modelling tax avoidance costs, see Slemrod (2001), is to posit a
cost of avoidance function C(A;￿), where A = a￿ is the amount of concealed income. If one assumes that C(:)
is homogeneous of degree one in A and ￿, then it is possible to de￿ne a per-unit-of-gross-income tax-avoidance-
cost as c(a) ￿ C(a;1). The homogeneity assumption, which means that the tax avoidance technology exhibits
constant returns to scale, is also made by Boadway et al. (1994).
11Since we assume that losses are not subsidized at the margin, we may take it that a type-n individual never
chooses e whenever n ￿ w < 0.
4where ￿ is the occupation-based lump sum tax levied on entrepreneurs (a subsidy when nega-
tive), t 2 [0;1] is the marginal income tax rate on entrepreneurs and ￿ is a universal lump-sum
subsidy.12 By A1(i), tax avoidance is chosen by maximizing net income with respect to ae
(entrepreneurs are price-takers on the labor market). The ￿rst order condition for an interior
solution is t = ce
a, that can be solved for the optimal ae. Let ^ ae(t) be the optimal choice for ae
and let ^ ce = ce(^ ae).
To shorten notation, let ^ ￿
e
￿ 1 ￿ t + t^ ae ￿ ^ ce. With ae optimally chosen, net income
associated to e is thus ye = ￿￿￿ +^ ￿
e
s(n￿w). It is not di¢ cult to prove a few results that we
will use later on. We have that tax avoidance is zero when income is not taxed at the margin,
and positive when taxed; that 100% tax avoidance never occurs, unless t = 1 and ce
a(1) = 1;
that the proportion of avoided income is increasing in the tax rate and, ￿nally, that the e⁄ective
marginal tax rate, t ￿ t^ ae + ^ ce, is smaller than the statutory tax rate, t. Formally:
Lemma 1 Under A2: (i) ^ ae(0) = 0, ^ ae 2 (0;1) for t 2 (0;1), ^ ae(1) ￿ 1. (ii) ^ ae
t = 1=^ ce
aa > 0
(iii) t^ ae ￿ ^ ce, ^ ￿
e
> 0 for all t. (iv) ^ ￿
e
t = ￿(1 ￿ ^ ae).
Proof. Part (i) comes directly from A2(ii) and t = ce
a. Part (ii) comes from totally
di⁄erentiating t ￿ ce
a = 0 and using A2(ii). Part (iii) comes from the fact that, if t > 0 then
R ^ ae
0 [t ￿ ce
a]dae = t^ ae ￿ ce(^ ae) > 0, since t > ce
a for ae 2 [0;^ ae); if t = 0 then ^ ae = ^ ce = 0.
Hence ^ ￿
e
> 0, since (1 ￿ t) > 0 for t < 1 and (t^ ae ￿ ^ ce) > 0 for t > 0. Part (iv) comes from the
envelope theorem, by which ^ ￿
e
t = ￿1 + ^ ae + (t ￿ ^ ce
a)^ ae
t = ￿1 + ^ ae, since t = ^ ce
a.
A type-n worker net income is equal to
￿ + [1 ￿ ￿ + ￿aw ￿ cw(aw)]wn;
where aw 2 [0;1] is the fraction of avoided income, cw(:) are the unit tax avoidance costs, and
￿ 2 [0;1] is the marginal income tax rate on workers. Note that we assumed that avoidance costs
vary between workers and entrepreneurs; this is a simple way of re￿ ecting a natural dispersion
of opportunities for tax dodging across the population (see the Introduction). At this stage,
we leave it open whether workers can cheat the government more easily than entrepreneurs or
the other way round. For the sake of generality, we also took the tax rates to be (in principle)
di⁄erentiated; we will notice when necessary the cases in which setting t = ￿ makes a di⁄erence
12The occupation-based lump sum tax ￿ is not deductible from the income tax base, but, as it is immediate
to show, the alternative assumption (deductibility) would not a⁄ect the results.
5for policy analysis. Finally, there is no occupation-based lump sum tax/subsidy on workers.
This restriction is without loss of generality; as we will see from the arbitrage equation (1)
below, an increase in a workers￿lump sum tax would be actually equivalent to a reduction of
entrepreneurs￿lump sum tax ￿.
Tax avoidance is chosen by workers by maximizing net income with respect to aw. Let
^ aw(￿) be the optimal choice for aw and let ^ cw = cw(^ aw) and ^ ￿
w
￿ 1￿￿ +￿^ aw ￿ ^ cw. With aw
optimally chosen, net income associated to w is thus yw = ￿+^ ￿
w
wn. Regarding cw(:), we use
the same set of assumptions introduced for ce(:):
Assumption 3 (i) cw(0) = 0, cw > 0 for aw > 0. (ii) cw
a (0) = 0, cw
a > 0 for aw > 0, cw
aa > 0,
cw
a (1) ￿ 1.
Hence, results similar to those derived for entrepreneurs hold for tax avoidance behavior by
workers:
Lemma 2 Under A3: (i) ^ aw(0) = 0, ^ aw 2 (0;1) for ￿ 2 (0;1), ^ aw(1) ￿ 1. (ii) ^ aw
￿ = 1=^ cw
aa > 0
(iii) ￿^ aw ￿ ^ cw, ^ ￿
w
> 0 for all ￿. (iv) ^ ￿
w
￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ^ aw).
We are now ready to de￿ne occupational choices. These are governed by the following
arbitrage equation:
ye ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ^ ￿
e
s(n￿ ￿ w) = ￿ + ^ ￿
w
wn ￿ yw; (1)
where n￿ is the marginal skill. This condition establishes that the net income of the marginal
workers (the most able among them) must equal the net income of the marginal entrepreneurs
(the least skilled). Thus, by A1(ii) and A1(iii), those individuals whose ability goes from l to
n￿ (included) choose w, while those whose ability goes from n￿ (excluded) to h choose e.13







where the l.h.s. represents total labor supply, and the r.h.s. total labor demand.
13The separation between high-ability agents (who become entrepreneurs) and low-ability agents (who become
workers), while analytically extremely convenient, is not a general property of the sort of occupational model we
employ here. Boadway et al. (1994, fn. 4) discuss alternative su¢ cient conditions under which the separation
occurs, one of which is that production can be written (in our notation) as nk(s) where k is a concave function.
Since our production function is simply ns, the condition is satis￿ed.
6Eqs. (1) and (2) determine the equilibrium value of the marginal skill, ~ n￿, and the equilib-
rium wage rate, ~ w, as a function of the policy variables,
~ n￿ =
p
s2 + l2 + 2sh ￿ s; (3)
~ w =





s + ^ ￿
w
~ n￿ : (4)
It is immediate to see that ~ n￿ 2 (l;h) for all s > 0. As for the equilibrium wage rate, we
consider only triples of the tax parameters ￿, ￿ and t ( ~ w is independent of ￿) ensuring that
~ w ￿ 0 and ~ n￿ ￿ ~ w ￿ 0:
De￿nition 1 The set of admissible tax policies is de￿ned by
T = ft 2 [0;1];￿ 2 [0;1];￿ 2 <;￿ 2 < such that 0 ￿ ~ w ￿ ~ n￿g:
As for the impact of tax instruments on the wage rate, from (4) we get (see Appendix A.1
for the details):
~ w￿ = ￿(^ ￿
e
s + ^ ￿
w
~ n￿)￿1 < 0; (5)
~ w￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ^ aw)~ n￿ ~ w ~ w￿ > 0; (6)
~ wt = (1 ￿ ^ ae)s(~ n￿ ￿ ~ w) ~ w￿ < 0: (7)
The intuition is straightforward. For a given wage rate, an increase in ￿ or in t would result
in an excess of labor supply as some entrepreneurs (the least skilled among them) would now
prefer to shift to a salaried job; ~ w thus lowers so as to clear the labor market. A reversed line
of arguments holds for an increase in ￿.
For later use, it is useful to de￿ne the following variables. Let the fraction of workers be
qw = (~ n￿ ￿ l)N￿1, and let their mean skill level be ￿ nw = (~ n￿ ￿ l)￿1 R ~ n￿
l ndn. Similarly, de￿ne
qe = (h ￿ ~ n￿)N￿1 and ￿ ne = (h ￿ ~ n￿)￿1 R h
~ n￿ndn.
3 Presumptive lump-lum taxation








where g(￿) is increasing and concave; in the special case when g(y) ￿ y we have a utilitarian
objective. Since the income distribution in the laissez-faire economy is unequal, there is a case
for intervention on equity grounds.
7Consider then an economy in which the linear income tax rates, (￿;t), are ￿xed at some
arbitrary level ￿including possibly (0;0). Using these conventional instruments, the government
will generally be able, within each group, to tax more heavily those who earn a higher income.
However, the presence of tax avoidance will impair the government￿ s capability to redistribute
income using the income tax. Indeed, we saw from Lemmas 1 and 2 that the e⁄ective marginal
tax rates are lower than the statutory tax rates, which makes the tax schedule less progressive
in practice than it appears to be; moreover, taxpayers waste resources when engaging in the
tax avoidance activity. Also, entrepreneurs and workers di⁄er in their capability to hide the tax
base, which makes redistribution across groups via income taxation even less e⁄ective.
To investigate the usefulness of presumptive taxation as an equitable policy tool, we adopt
the reform approach. Hence, we consider small welfare-improving revenue-neutral reforms,
whereby the policy instruments are in￿nitesimally adjusted in such a way that the government
budget constraint is not violated, but social welfare has increased. It is well-known that it is
formally equivalent to work either with the resource constraint or with the revenue constraint.
In our case, it is easier to work with the former. Then, we have that the exogenous revenue
target ￿ R equals total output less total disposable income and less the total cost of avoidance








~ yw dn ￿
Z h
~ n￿
~ ye dn ￿
Z ~ n￿
l
^ cw ~ wndn ￿
Z h
~ n￿
^ ces(n ￿ ~ w)dn
)
= ￿ R; (9)
where ~ yw and ~ ye denote equilibrium net incomes:
~ yw = ￿ + ^ ￿
w
~ wn; n 2 [l; ~ n￿]; (10)
~ ye = ￿ ￿ ￿ + ^ ￿
e
s(n ￿ ~ w); n 2 (~ n￿;h]: (11)
We now look for a small reform (d￿;d￿) in which an increase (decrease) in the presumptive
tax levied on entrepreneurs (d￿) is matched with an increase (decrease) in the lump-sum uni-
versal subsidy (d￿) so as to leave the government budget (the resource constraint) una⁄ected
and at same time raise social welfare.
Using (5), the derivatives of (10) and (11) with respect to ￿ and ￿ are:
~ yw
￿ = ~ ye
￿ = 1; (12)
~ yw
￿ = ^ ￿
w
~ w￿n; ~ ye
￿ = ￿(1 + ^ ￿
e
~ w￿) = ^ ￿
w
~ w￿~ n￿: (13)
We use these to di⁄erentiate the resource contraint (9):
d￿ + (qw￿ nw + qe~ n￿)^ ￿
w
~ w￿d￿ + qw^ cw￿ nw ~ w￿d￿ ￿ qe^ ces ~ w￿d￿ = 0; (14)
8so that, using (2) to substitute qw￿ nw for qes and solving (14) for d￿, we get:
d￿jdR=0 = ￿^ ￿
w
(qw￿ nw + qe~ n￿) ~ w￿d￿ + qes(^ ce ￿ ^ cw) ~ w￿d￿: (15)
Totally di⁄erentiating (10) and (11), using (12) and (13), the impact of a revenue-neutral tax
reform in terms of agents net incomes is characterized as follows:





(n￿ ￿ n) ~ w￿d￿ + qes(^ ce ￿ ^ cw) ~ w￿d￿; n 2 [l; ~ n￿]; (16)
d~ yej(d￿;d￿)jdR=0 = d￿jdR=0 + ^ ￿
w
~ w￿~ n￿d￿ =
= ^ ￿
w
qw(~ n￿ ￿ ￿ nw) ~ w￿d￿ + qes(^ ce ￿ ^ cw) ~ w￿d￿; n 2 (~ n￿;h]; (17)
where n￿ ￿ ￿ nw +qe(~ n￿ ￿ ￿ nw), with l < n￿ < ~ n￿. The ￿rst term in both (16) and (17) captures
the redistributive impact of the tax reform, whereas the second term in both expressions ￿
identical for all agents ￿ re￿ ects the impact on the e¢ ciency loss associated with the avoidance
costs.
3.1 Presumptive taxes as a substitute for conventional taxes
If there is no income taxation, we have t = ￿ = 0 and therefore ^ ce = ^ cw = 0, hence the second
term in both (16) and (17) vanishes. In this case, presumptive taxation has only a redistribution
e⁄ect (recall that we have no labour-leisure choice). It is immediate to see that a tax reform such
that d￿ > 0 has a negative impact on entrepreneurs￿net income, since ~ w￿ < 0 and ~ n￿ > ￿ nw;
the loss is the same in absolute size for all entrepreneurs. The reform has however a positive
impact on the poorest among workers, namely those with ability n < n￿; the absolute gain is
decreasing in n, and is zero for those with n = n￿. The ￿rich￿workers, those with n > n￿, are
instead penalized by the tax reform; the absolute loss is increasing in n. Importantly, the three




(n￿ ￿ n)dn +
Z h
~ n￿
qw(~ n￿ ￿ ￿ nw)dn = 0: (18)
Hence, (18) tells us that, without income taxation,
Z ~ n￿
l
d~ ywj(d￿;d￿)jdR=0 dn +
Z h
~ n￿
d~ yej(d￿;d￿)jdR=0 dn = 0: (19)
Given its lump-sum nature, the occupation-based presumptive tax system purely redistributes
income among the citizens. Hence, a utilitarian planner would reject a tax reform involving
9an increase in ￿, because there is no e¢ ciency gain to be reaped ￿ (19) is exactly the social
welfare change induced by the tax reform when the government is utilitarian. However, a reform
such that d￿ > 0 would be welfare improving for any kind of strictly concave welfare function,
since the government values the increase in the net income of the poor workers more than the
income losses incurred by the middle-earners (workers with ability above n￿) and high-earners
(entrepreneurs) ￿ this follows from the concavity of g(￿).
So far we have characterised a local result, but we can also easily identify the optimal ￿,
which is simply the value of ￿ that brings to zero the wage rate: indeed, the redistributive
terms in (16) and (17) are independent of ￿, therefore they call for a corner solution, the largest
admissible value of ￿. Summing up:
Proposition 1 In the absence of income taxation, a revenue-neutral tax reform such that d￿ >
0 is welfare improving for any strictly concave social welfare function. The optimal ￿ is such
that ~ w = 0, i.e. ￿ = s~ n￿.
Proposition 1 strikes a point in favour of presumptive taxation in a very sharp way. When-
ever conventional income taxes cannot be used, which is a common situation in many transition
and developing economies, the government has at its disposal a simple and e⁄ective way of
achieving some redistribution, namely setting up a presumptive tax system based on occupa-
tional choices, in which entrepreneurs are taxed. The intuition is obvious: the di⁄erences in
occupational status proxy the di⁄erences in income and thus shifting the tax burden towards
the entrepreneurs/high income agents is good for welfare whenever the government has a redis-
tributive objective. Morevoer, the presumptive tax redistributes not only between occupational
groups, but also within the workers￿ s group in favour of the less well-o⁄.
3.2 Presumptive taxes as a complement to conventional taxes
What happens when also the more conventional income taxes are being used? The subsequent
analysis shows that, for arbitrary values of the income tax rates, there is a wide range of
cases in which a presumptive tax system improves redistribution. With income taxation, in
addition to the redistribution terms in (16) and (17), we need to take note of the e¢ ciency term
qes(^ ce ￿ ^ cw) ~ w￿, which, we recall, is the same for all agents ￿^ ce and ^ cwdepend only on the tax
rates. It is easy to see that the sign of the e¢ ciency term depends on the di⁄erence between
the unit cost of avoidance for the two occupational groups. If ^ ce = ^ cw, i.e. agents from the
two groups waste in equilibrium the same amount of resources for each unit of income hidden
10from tax authorities, there is no e¢ ciency gain from presumptive taxation. The same analysis
as before applies; so, for example, if t = ￿, and, importantly, the avoidance cost functions are
the same for entrepreneurs and workers, it is desirable to set d￿ > 0.
If ^ ce < ^ cw, the term is positive (since ~ w￿ < 0), hence, a tax reform involving d￿ > 0
will improve the welfare of everybody via an e¢ ciency gain, because it reduces the amount of
resources wasted by the tax avoidance e⁄orts. The key to this result is that an increase in
￿ causes, as we know from the comparative statics, a reduction in the wage rate; therefore,
the gross incomes of the workers decrease, while those of the entrepreneurs (for whom wages
represent costs) increase. Thus, there is redistribution, in terms of gross incomes, towards the
group whose tax avoidance behaviour is less costly to society. In this event, there will be a
larger group of agents bene￿ting from a reform such that d￿ > 0, relative to the case in which
the e¢ ciency term is absent; not only the poor workers (n < n￿), but also (some of the) rich
workers and maybe the entrepreneurs may enjoy an increase in their net income, if the e¢ ciency
e⁄ect is large enough to o⁄set the equity e⁄ect. Indeed, if ^ ce is su¢ ciently smaller than ^ cw,
then the reform may turn out to be Pareto-improving, as (16) and (17) may be positive for all
n.
If ^ ce > ^ cw, the opposite holds: from an e¢ ciency point of view, it is desirable to set d￿ < 0.
Thus, a reform such that d￿ > 0 will be desirable only if the government is strongly inequality-
averse and the e¢ ciency loss is small enough to avoid o⁄setting the redistributive gain for
low-earners. On the other hand, if the e¢ ciency gain from setting d￿ < 0 is su¢ ciently large,
it may in principle happen that the reform is Pareto-improving.
Take for example the extreme case of a Rawlsian planner, for whom only the welfare of those
at the bottom of the income distribution matters: using (16), the impact of tax reforms on the
net income of the poorest individuals, n = l, can easily seen to be:




(n￿ ￿ l) ￿ qes(^ ce ￿ ^ cw)
i
~ w￿d￿ = ￿B(l) ~ w￿d￿: (20)
A revenue-neutral tax reform d￿ > 0 improves the welfare of poorest individuals if the term
in square brackets, B(l), is positive; a su¢ cient condition for this is ^ ce ￿ ^ cw. In the case of
a Ralwsian objective, such a reform is therefore welfare-improving; actually, from (18) we can
conclude that the same holds true for any concave social welfare function.
The condition ^ ce ￿ ^ cw is only su¢ cient, for B(l) > 0 may hold even if ^ ce > ^ cw. In that
case, there is a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency, calling for d￿ < 0, and equity, calling for d￿ > 0.
For the Rawlsian planner, a revenue-neutral tax reform with d￿ > 0 continues to be welfare
11improving; the result does not generalise however to all concave social welfare function, as a
strong degree of inequality aversion is needed. Indeed, if inequality aversion is weak or absent
(utilitarianism), a welfare-improvement is achieved by setting d￿ < 0.
Finally, when ^ ce > ^ cw and B(l) < 0, both e¢ ciency and equity call for a subsidy, hence
a revenue-neutral tax reform such that d￿ < 0 is welfare improving in the case of a Ralwsian
objective; indeed, it is Pareto-improving, since if the term in brackets is negative for n = l, it
must be negative also for all other values of n. Summing up:
Proposition 2 For any given t 2 [0;1], ￿ 2 [0;1],
￿ If ^ ce ￿ ^ cw a revenue-neutral tax reform such that d￿ > 0 is welfare-improving for any
concave social welfare function. If ^ ce ￿ ^ cw and d~ yej(d￿;d￿)jdR=0 > 0 (eq. 17) a revenue-
neutral tax reform such that d￿ > 0 is Pareto-improving
￿ If ^ ce > ^ cw and B(l) > 0, there exists a su¢ ciently concave social welfare function for
which a revenue-neutral tax reform such that d￿ > 0 is welfare-improving; if the objective
function is utilitarian, the welfare-improving reform requires setting d￿ < 0.
￿ Finally, if ^ ce > ^ cw and B(l) ￿ 0, a revenue-neutral tax reform such that d￿ < 0 is
Pareto-improving.
As before, all terms de￿ning the direction of the optimal tax reform are independent of ￿;
hence, we can immediately get the following global results:
Corollary 1 For any given t 2 [0;1], ￿ 2 [0;1], if ^ ce ￿ ^ cw the optimal ￿ is such that ~ w = 0,
i.e. ￿ = ^ ￿
e
s~ n￿, for any concave social welfare function. If ^ ce > ^ cw and B(l) > 0, there exists
a su¢ ciently concave social welfare function such that ￿ = ^ ￿
e
s~ n￿ is optimal; in the utilitarian
case ￿ = ￿^ ￿
w
(~ n￿) is optimal. Finally, if ^ ce > ^ cw and B(l) ￿ 0, the Pareto-e¢ cient ￿ is such
that ~ n￿ ￿ ~ w = 0, i.e. ￿ = ￿^ ￿
w
(~ n￿)2.
As we can see, it is generally the case that an occupation-based lump-sum presumptive tax
system ameliorates welfare, sometime for all members of the community, sometimes only if the
government is su¢ ciently inequality averse. The usefulness of this form of taxation is con￿rmed
no matter the levels at which the marginal tax rates are set, and no matter which group wastes
more resources in tax avoidance. Perhaps somewhat strikingly, it might happen that the reform
involves subsidising the entrepreneurs, who are at the top of the income distribution; if for
12example we take the extreme, although not unreasonable view that workers cannot avoid the
income tax (so that in equilibrium ^ cw = 0), while entrepreneurs can, the e¢ ciency term may
be indeed large enough to obtain B(l) < 0. If that is the case, a presumptive subsidy for high-
earning businessmen improves the welfare of all by exploiting the market-induced adjustment
of the wage rate; importantly, this holds for all admissible values of the marginal income tax
rates.14
4 Conclusions
In several developing and transition as well as developed countries, citizens can escape their tax
obligations. This may severely limit the redistributive action of the governments. One of the
possible responses to that problem is for the governments to engage in some form of presumptive
taxation. In this paper, we have argued that presumptive taxation may indeed be a useful
instrument for raising the welfare of the less well-o⁄ and sometimes of all citizens, although
it may achieve this outcome in a somewhat unexpected fashion. Indeed, we saw that there
are circumstances in which the entrepreneurs, who are at the top of the income distribution,
have to be subsidized in order to achieve an improvement of the workers￿welfare. The reason
why this occurs is that presumptive taxes have not only a redistributive action, but also a⁄ect
e¢ ciency through the amount of resources devoted to tax avoidance. Our occupational choice
model can indeed capture the general equilibrium e⁄ects of taxation, and we are therefore able to
show that presumptive taxes (as opposed to subsidies) can under certain circumstances increase
aggregate avoidance costs, thereby reducing their usefulness as redistributive devices. Several
authors, including Kaplow (1996), have emphasized that the interaction between market forces
and taxation is crucial for understanding the e⁄ect of the latter in the presence of tax avoidance.
Ours is basically an attempt at taking a step in that direction, and we hope therefore that the
present paper has some value as a methodological contribution as well as for its speci￿c results.
14The case in which only entrepeneures can avoid taxes is studied in Balestrino and Galmarini (2002).
13Appendix
A.1 Comparative statics
Derivative ~ w￿ in (5) is obtained immediately from (4). As for ~ w￿, using ^ ￿
w
￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ^ aw) from
Lemma 2(iv), (5) and (4), one obtains
~ w￿ =





s + ^ ￿
w
~ n￿)2 = ￿(1 ￿ ^ aw)~ n￿ ~ w ~ w￿: (A1)
Finally, using ^ ￿
e
t = ￿(1 ￿ ^ ae) from Lemma 1(iv), (5) and (4), one gets
~ wt =
￿(1 ￿ ^ ae)s~ n￿
^ ￿
e
s + ^ ￿
w
~ n￿ +





s + ^ ￿
w
~ n￿)2 = (1 ￿ ^ ae)s(~ n￿ ￿ ~ w) ~ w￿: (A2)
A.2 The resource constraint





f￿￿ + (1 ￿ ^ aw)￿ ~ wng dn +
Z h
~ n￿
f￿￿ + (1 ￿ ^ ae)ts(n ￿ ~ w)g dn
)
= ￿ R: (A3)
Substituting ￿￿+(1￿^ aw)￿ ~ wn = ￿~ yw +(1￿^ cw) ~ wn and ￿￿+(1￿^ ae)ts(n￿ ~ w) = ￿~ ye +(1￿























s ~ wdn ￿
Z h
~ n￿
^ ces(n ￿ ~ w)dn
￿
= ￿ R: (A4)
Since
R ~ n￿
l ~ wndn = ~ w
R h
~ n￿ ~ wsdn from the labor market clearing condition (2), we get the resource
constraint (9).
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